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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the performance of Kak’s three stage quantum cryptographic 
protocol based on public key cryptography against a man-in-the-middle attack.  A 
method for protecting against such an attack is presented using certificates distributed by 
a trusted third party. 
 
Introduction 
 
The three-stage quantum cryptographic protocol introduced in [1] uses properties of 
quantum mechanics to apply a series of secret commutative transformations on a qubit 
which is exchanged over a public channel.  Unlike the BB84 protocol [2], all three 
transmissions are performed on quantum channels, eliminating the possibility of 
successful eavesdropping at any point during the exchange.   
 
The protocol is, however, susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack [3], in which the 
adversary (Eve) intercepts a message from Alice and creates a new message to send to 
Bob (Fig.1).  Eve performs the exchange with Alice using the original message, while 
Bob performs the exchange using the newly created message.  At the final stage, Eve has 
the original message in decrypted form, while Bob has the message created by Eve.  It is 
unknown to Bob that his message originated from Eve and not Alice. 
 
One approach used in classical cryptography to defend against the man-in-the-middle 
attack is authentication through the use of trusted certificates [4].  The same concept can 
be extended to quantum cryptographic protocols as well.  This paper presents an 
alteration of Kak’s protocol which includes the use of quantum entangled certificates, 
distributed by a trusted authority, for the purpose of authentication.  The strength in this 
modification relies on the inability of Eve to duplicate and existing entanglement.    
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Figure1. Man-in-the-middle attack 
 
Authentication 
 
Let a certificate authority, CA, distribute a set of entangled qubits [5] [6] to Alice and 
Bob.  The sequence of entangled pairs constitutes Bell states which are not known to Eve.  
The pre-shared master key between the clients and the CA consists of the type of Bell 
states that are transmitted as session certificates. 
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When Alice wants to send a message to Bob, she appends her certificate to the message.  
The message exchange is carried out just as demonstrated previously with only one minor 
change.  At the end of the exchange, Bob collapses his certificate and compares it to 
Alice’s as a method of authentication (Fig. 2).  If Bob’s newly received message is truly 
authentic, then the included certificate will correspond to Bob’s certificate.  As a further 
enhancement, the placement of the certificate within the message can be a function of the 
master key. 
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   Figure 2. The new protocol 
 
Example 1 
 
Suppose the master key (known by Alice and Bob) indicates that the type of Bell states 
transmitted as the certificate will be [ ]01000001 ββββ=Β AB .  For Bob to check the 
authenticity of the message received, he simply needs to perform an XOR of his 
certificate, the received certificate, and the master key. 
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If the result of the XOR operation contains a 1, then the certificate is not authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 3
Conclusion 
 
This paper extends the use of certificates of authenticity from classical cryptography to 
quantum cryptography.  A method using entangled qubits distributed by a trusted third 
party provides a significant defense against the man-in-the-middle attack to which other 
protocols including BB84 are vulnerable.  Recent advances in technologies for creating 
quantum entangled particles [6] confirm the feasibility of the realization of such a 
protocol. 
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